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Final draft. December 2013 
Contribution to the Expert Meeting on Employment targeting and sectoral approaches to job 
creation,  ILO, Geneva, 10-11 October 2013 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to properly function, labour markets need a set of rules, organizations, policies and 
resources. Among them, unemployment insurance, wage setting rules, employment services, 
retraining programmes and employment protection legislation are developed to some degree 
in all countries, as well as a collective bargaining framework. All these elements can be 
considered as labour market institutions, used - and transformed - by labour market actors: 
firms and workers, social partners and government, this last one with a dual role: legislator 
and controller on one side, and a particular employer on the other. Labour markets are deeply 
embedded in the societies they belong to. Robert Solow summed up this point when he chose 
as a title for one of his books “The labor market as a social institution” (Solow 1990). 
When one considers these institutions among countries, one is struck by their wide diversity 
and even heterogeneity. To take one example, apprenticeship is a key labour market 
institution in some countries where the bulk of the workers come from this training and 
recruiting route, while it remains marginal in others. The diversity comes from the specificity 
of societal contexts and history, but also from the variety of objectives pursued by each 
scheme and rule: e.g. efficiency and equity considerations may be combined in multiple ways. 
Labour markets are usually segmented in different submarkets. Some groups, benefitting from 
long – term and secured careers with promotional ladders, may be favoured by some 
institutions, while others are left aside or excluded. Another essential source of variety is the 
degree of implementation on the rules, depending on the size of the informal sector, on the 
political will and the amount of resources devoted to detecting and sanctioning 
noncompliance. There may be a big gap, and even an abyss between laws or signed 
agreements and their implementation. Last, one should take into consideration the interaction 
of all these institutions between each other and also with the whole social and economic 
sphere. 
Beyond this diversity, unifying views have been elaborated by actors, experts and researchers. 
Several policy-oriented views emerged in the 90s, proposing different “labour market 
reforms”  ensuring that these institutions bring or ease labour market adjustments to short 
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term and long term needs. Among them, one may cite the “flexibility agenda” advocated by 
the OECD , the World Bank and the IMF, the “decent work” agenda promoted by the ILO, 
the “flexicurity” agenda developed by the European Union, and the “Transitional Labour 
Market” (TLM) perspective elaborated by a group of European researchers. 
In this contribution, we shall not focus on the content, relevance or limits of each perspective 
(for a short discussion, see Auer and Gazier 2008), but we shall take stock of previous ILO 
work  (Auer 2005 and 2007, Auer and Chatani 2011) and propose, connected to the “decent 
work” and TLM agendas, the concept of “protected mobility” as a synthetic priority for 
analyzing labour market institutions in their contribution to the creation of productive 
employment, in the context of the persisting difficulties created by the world crisis triggered 
in 2007. 
The period before the crisis was characterised by a big push for labour market deregulation. 
The idea was that with increasing globalisation, labour markets had to adapt quickly to shifts 
in demand, production technologies and new markets. In general it was believed that when all 
other markets (e.g. goods and financial markets) became increasingly liberalized, the labour 
market could not remain unreformed. The  crisis seemed in a first phase have led to a renewed 
interest in (re-) regulation, because it was believed that excessive deregulation of the financial 
market was the major cause of the crisis. However, very soon, reregulation of the financial 
sector was watered down, and the pressures for labour market reforms continued and became 
even stronger. In addition the idea that microeconomic factors weighing on the supply side of 
the economy (e.g. all institutions touching the price of labour) has again taken its dominant 
place, whereas during the crisis the (aggregate) demand side of the economy was seen as the 
lever to be pushed for resolving some of the most damaging effects of deregulation.  
This facts are to be seen in all proposals and action plans for the countries still in crisis, e.g. 
the Southern European countries, where we can see policy packages that combine budget 
austerity with labour market deregulation, leading to reduced wages, social benefits and 
employment protection. 
The benefits of regulation, and policies concerned with a high level of aggregate demand, 
requiring decent wages, both as stabilizing factors for the economy, are today largely 
forgotten. If at all, only a minimum level of LMIs is accepted by the main economic players 
and austerity policies dominate everywhere. 
This text, while posing also some critical question in regards to excessive regulation as well, , 
supports  the beneficial effects of labour market institutions, when they are well designed. 
This requires also that these labour market regulations and their reforms are not dictated top 
down but are bargained between the socio-economic partners.  
While the text supports also ideas about the positive interaction of “smart” regulation and a 
more assertive demand side macroeconomic policy, it cannot develop these ideas in any 
length. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in some detail the meaning, 
justification and implications of the concept of “protected mobility”. In section 3, we shall 
separately review four main components of labour market institutions, analyze their 
objectives and means in this perspective, and provide examples of interesting practices. 
Section 4 will be devoted to some remarks on the interplay of these institutions in the 
perspective of the productive transformation of an economy. Section 5 provides a short 
conclusion. 
 
 
2. The concept of protected mobility: from job security, employment security to 
labour market security 
 
Emerging at the beginning of this century from empirical as well as normative work done 
under the aegis of the ILO, the concept of “protected mobility” has been developed as a 
contribution to the long lasting debate on the “structural labour market reforms” advocated by 
international organizations such as the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank. While anybody 
agrees on the idea that labour markets should enhance smooth and quick adjustments to the 
changing conditions of our globalized world, researchers and social actors strongly diverge on 
the role that should be played by market flexibility: flexibility of wages, of employment 
contracts, of hours… A related and more consensual  idea is that labour market institutions 
should convey flexibility as well as security: flexibility for firms and security for workers, 
even if this statement is simplistic2. Against this backdrop, “protected mobility” appears as a 
way to combine flexibility (here: mobility across jobs,  firms, sectors, occupations, regions…) 
and security (here achieved by employment protection rules and labour market adjustment 
policies). But how to understand this combination and which role should it play? 
We shall proceed in two steps. First we shall sum up the main arguments introducing 
“protected mobility” as an overarching objective for labour market institutions and reforms. 
Second, inspired by the “Transitional Labour Market” (TLM) perspective (see Gazier and 
Gautié 2011 for a recent synthesis) we shall show that in order to go further it is necessary to 
consider together two elements too often taken separately: transitions and positions in the 
labour market and around it. We shall introduce the idea of “transition capacity” from the 
worker’s viewpoint, and show that it is critical in order to efficiently promote “protected 
mobility”. 
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2.1. “Protected mobility”: the core arguments 
Workers’ mobility as a central labour market adjustment channel 
On any market, there exist three main categories of variables that may, in a separate or in a 
simultaneous way, contribute to the adjustment between supply and demand: prices, quantities 
and qualities. In the case of the labour market, prices are wages; quantities are the number of 
available jobs, hours and workers; “qualities” are the skill level and competences of workers, 
and the skills requirements and attractivity of jobs. Wages are a variable depending on 
complex and multiple determinants: reflecting the productive contribution of a worker or a 
group of workers and / or their relative scarcity, but also reflecting hierarchical positions and 
career profiles, acting as an incentive and often influenced by moral, political or social norms 
(e.g. workers, unions and public opinion are strongly opposed to massive wage cuts3). This 
may explain that while some wages in some sectors prove to be highly flexible and even 
volatile, in most sectors of the formal economy they are “sticky” i.e. they change in a smooth 
and organized way, for example through the translation of a wage grid as a result of a 
periodical wage bargaining session taking into account inflation and productivity 
expectations. Quantities are very often used as adjustment channels in firms and on the labour 
markets: modulation of working time, supplementary hours or short-time working; but also 
hiring and firing decisions, downsizing; these adjustments accompany the reallocation of the 
remaining workers inside firms; on the labour market, one may consider the size and 
evolution of unemployment, the case of workers taking a leave, and also the number of 
persons in early retirement schemes (although early retirement schemes have been widely 
criticized and became less relevant). Discouraged workers can also be considered as a 
quantity adjustment (an undesirable one) on the labour market in the case of widespread 
unemployment. Last, “quality” adjustments may consist in training and retraining the 
workforce, and in improving (or downgrading) the skill content of a given job. Of course 
these three categories of variables often play together and interact, each sub-variable bearing 
part of the needed adjustment. They can act either as complements, for example when 
workers’ reallocation combines part-time bridging jobs and training measures and/or as 
substitutes, for example in the case of training that does not lead to a  wage increase, which is 
a functional equivalent to a “hidden”wage cut, because trained and thus more productive 
workers are paid the same as before. 
Wages are often “sticky” and difficult to adjust; most labour market adjustments are a mix of 
quantities (volume of hours, jobs created or destroyed) and “qualities”, because, compared to 
destroyed jobs, new jobs appear in other plants, other firms, other sectors and / or other 
regions, and may be more qualified. Together with on-the-job training, this continuous 
process of creation and destruction of jobs is one key determinant of the productivity growth 
in a given country. This makes job reallocation and workers’ mobility a central stake on 
today’s labour markets and explains why, either left to deregulated processes or organized to 
some degree, either alone or combined with other devices such as retraining, workers mobility 
is at the heart of currently discussed labour market reforms proposals. 
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From job security to employment security… and to labour market security 
Following here Auer and Chatani 2011, section 5, we can start from the widely accepted and 
quite commonsense idea that security for workers mainly stems from holding stable jobs. This 
was the traditional picture offered by the first analysts of labour market segmentation 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971): the success criterium for a worker is, after having experienced 
some short-term jobs, to get a long-term work contract and become a stabilized employee in a 
so-called “internal labour market”. This is all the more the case today, in a world where stable 
jobs seem to become less numerous and more difficult to obtain and keep, and where 
unstable, precarious jobs, seem to trap their holders into a vicious circle of marginality and 
poverty.  
However one frequent idea popularized by analysts and policymakers is that the security 
ensured by firms through stable jobs is no more sufficient and that this deficiency will be 
durable4. Accordingly, they propose to complement (stable, firm-provided) job protection by 
the ability to shift from one employer to another, what implies other actors and sources, ie.  
employment protection.  
However this shift, which has been advocated by the promoters of “flexicurity” in Europe, 
proved to be misleading on two important points. First, it seems to end up into a more or less 
virtual “employability” protection. As say Auer and Chatani 2011 (op. cit): “… the problem 
with selling employability as employment security is that it sells a potentiality (access to jobs) 
for a fact (holding a job)”. Second, it neglects the key role of firms in securing their workers 
by organizing internal shifts from one job to another – what has been termed “employment 
security” in an initial and more relevant meaning. Such role has been highlighted in the case 
of Japanese firms developing polyvalence (ability to perform multiple tasks). 
This is the reason why it is better to speak of “labour market security”. Job security and 
employment security (in this last, restrictive sense, as provided by a single firm), cannot 
protect workers in increasingly flexible labour markets.. Labour market security gives 
additional layers of security, by organizing protected mobility, i.e. protected transitions in and 
around the labour market, through labour market policies and social rights. This perspective is 
grounded, as it has been shown by the “Transitional Labour Market” researchers, on a 
dynamic view on careers and workers’ trajectories. Holding a stable job remains central, but 
as a matter of fact during the whole life course people undertake many transitions, e.g. from 
school and training to work, and back in the case of retraining leaves, from full-time to part-
time work, from one employer to another and so on. Labour market security consists in 
avoiding “bad” transitions leading to durable unemployment and/or poverty, and promoting 
“good” transitions leading to stable and productive jobs at the end of the day. As Auer and 
Chatani 2011 (op. cit) conclude: “Employment security with internal adjustment flexibility 
and protected transitions are the two sides of labour market security”. 
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2.2.  Transitions, positions and transitions capacities 
The key question now becomes: how to understand and combine both sides of “labour market 
security”? A risk would be that, for some favoured workers, firms and labour market 
institutions cooperate in order to organize secure careers, while for other workers the Public 
Employment Service will try to compensate the indefinitely renewed instability of short-term 
contracts. An important observation is that a complete definition of a “transition” involves not 
only information about the transitory period to be secured but also information about the 
starting point and the arrival point. A transition starts from somewhere and should lead 
somewhere. Taken seriously, this remark brings at least three consequences.  
The first one is that policymakers intending to ensure “protected mobility” should consider 
not only the intrinsic characteristics of the transitions they want to foster, but also the 
characteristics of the “positions” they start from and they lead to. They should make sure that 
exist “stability poles” as safe arrival points for workers engaged into some mobility, either 
geographical or sectoral. The basic list of such “stability poles”, beyond the public sector and 
private firms when they offer stable employment, is the following: the branch/sector, the 
trade/craft, the “territory”, non-profit organizations (NPO). NPO and public employers are of 
course direct job providers. Branches and sectors, and trade, play as “stability poles” because 
for a worker with a given set of competencies it is easy and natural to contact plants and firms 
in the branch/sector to which belonged the firm (s)he comes from, and to apply to the same 
kind of work (s)he is entitled to. This leads to underline the key role played by the 
transferability of skills. Workers recruited in traditional “internal labour markets” sometimes 
develop high level competencies, but they are often specific to their firms, and then, not 
transferable. This may become a major source of difficulties if they are dismissed5. Last, the 
“territories” (regions, municipalities…) may act as a “stability pole” when proximity 
networks of information provide job opportunities to “local” workers. All these elements 
show that the fields of labour market policies and of macro-economic and productive 
development policies are closely intertwined. 
The second consequence is that transitions and positions should be carefully considered in 
their gender asymmetries. During their whole career, given the current specialization of 
family roles, women most often face the dual constraints of care and work. This explains that 
they are most of the time engaged in more transitions than men (typically women take 
parental leaves while for men it remains an exception, or limited to a very short period), and 
that they often hold positions (typically part-time jobs) combining paid work and domestic 
work. How to make progress in gender equality and how to secure women’s transitions and 
positions is a strategic issue. 
                                                          
5
 It is not the case with “professional labour markets”, a specific version of “internal labour markets” because 
they recruit workers through the apprenticeship system, giving them transferable skills. 
7 
 
The last consequence is that “protected mobility” is a subset of work and employment 
quality6. Work quality is today assessed through a set on indicators comprising wages, work 
intensity, work interest etc. but also the security given by the employment contract, the ability 
to be trained, to conciliate family duties and professional tasks… all these elements are at the 
core of “protected mobility”. 
The outcome of a mobility decision is highly contextual, and depends first on the set of 
opportunities available to the worker. In the case of countries, sectors or regions in a situation 
of tight labour market, close to full employment, mobility is easier, even if the question of 
labour market segmentation remains relevant. We have already seen that transferable skills 
also are important conditions for a successful outcome. Considering the departure situation of 
workers and combining both dimensions of context and transferability, the analysis proposed 
by T. Korver and G. Schmid 2012 puts into evidence that their transition capacity may vary 
from strong to very weak. In a situation of rare employment opportunities and non 
transferable skills, some workers may become trapped into long-term unemployment, losing 
their employability and confidence as they remain unemployed. Some others, still employed 
but under the threat of being dismissed, try to keep their current job on any condition. This 
entails two consequences. The first is that ensuring trust in one’s own initiative and 
developing enabling capacities is a necessary ingredient of protected mobility. The second 
consequence is that workers should be aware of their  rights and of the institutions organizing 
labour market mobility. They should understand the way they function, and be able to choose 
the best fitting option among options available. This leads to underline the key, sine qua non 
role played by social dialogue in “protected mobility”. in providing information about 
available adjustment packages.. 
 
3. Labour market institutions and policy tools for protected mobility 
 
It will not be possible, within the limited format of this chapter, to examine, even quickly, the 
whole set of labour market institutions. They comprise wage setting institutions (bargaining 
practices at different levels – national, branch, firm and even plant  level –, the complex set of 
working time regulations (normal length of a working day, holidays, supplementary hours…), 
training and (re)training institutions and arrangements and other active as well as passive 
labour market policy measures. As labour market training  will be discussed in another 
chapter of this book, we focus our analysis on four key sets of institutions: social dialogue, 
Employment Protection Legislation, income protection for the Unemployed, and labour 
market policies  including  employment services which constitute a policy package relevant 
for protected mobility. 
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3.1 Social dialogue 
Social dialogue involves all the social partners, who share information, diagnoses and who 
bargain. It may also involve national and local government bodies (tri- or quadripartite 
conferences or negotiations). Social dialogue can be appraised first in the functioning of 
specific labour market institutions: it may be allowed, encouraged or even practiced like a 
routine. And it may appear, in a more transversal way, as an overarching style of governing 
employment relations and labour market policies7. 
One may distinguish three modalities of social dialogue. The first is sharing information and 
diagnosis. The second is sharing decisions through collective bargaining; the third is the co-
management of some labour market institutions.  
• Sharing information and diagnosis is a key and basic ingredient of social dialogue. 
This ensures a sense of common fate and mutual respect, ending up in a feeling of 
security for workers. Among the important ways of sharing information, one may cite 
early notice in the case of restructuring decisions involving mass dismissals, which 
allows workers and unions to react and take initiatives in a pondered way, opens some 
space for negotiated arrangements and avoids short-term interactions dominated by 
fear and anger. Early notice (at least six months in advance) is a frequent practice in 
several countries, and often stipulated by law. Other information sharing devices,   are 
systematic and periodical meetings with social partners on the future evolution of jobs, 
competencies and work organization, which may prevent or better organize 
employment adjustment. Such meetings do not always end up into a shared diagnosis. 
Disagreements may persist among employers and unions, but at least partners may 
refer to a common basis 
 
• The importance of constructive collective bargaining cannot be over-emphasized. It 
prevents labour disputes, and it leads parties in conflict to reach negotiated resolution 
of disputes when they arise. It helps improve working conditions, too. Some 
economists regard trade unions as pressure groups negotiating for undue high wages 
above the market clearance level, thus disturbing the function of labour markets. This 
view is quite biased since it neglects the positive contribution of social dialogue to 
productivity gains. A rich body of literature has documented the contribution of 
kaizen, improvement at workshop level based on social dialogue, to the rapid 
productivity growth realized in Japan. ILO’s SCORE project replicated the model in 
developing countries where industrialization has been taking place.8 In addition to the 
benefits at the micro level, collective bargaining also contributes to a fair distribution 
of productivity gains, which supports the aggregate demand. Arguably, collective 
bargaining is more important in developing countries where production is rapidly 
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expanding but labour market institutions, especially labour administration, are weak. 
Mutual agreement between workers and employers is not a substitute for enforcement 
of labour regulations, but a supplement to them. In this sense, building the capacity of 
representatives of workers and employers in engaging in collective bargaining and 
forging trust among them are conducive not only to industrial peace and productivity 
gain but also to a broader development agenda that drives industrialization process. 
Nevertheless, promotion of collective bargaining often meets with challenges in many 
developing countries where the safeguard for fundamental workers’ rights stands on a 
fragile ground. 
 
 
Building the capacity for collective bargaining: the case of Viet-Nam 
 
Viet Nam upholds a strategic socio-economic development objective that the nation will 
be a modern industrialized one by 2020 with socio-political stability (The government of 
Viet Nam, 2010). In this context, it has taken steps to build sound industrial relations at 
the national level, as well as in export-oriented sectors. The National Industrial Relations 
Committee (NIRC), a tripartite advisory body to the Prime Minister in the field of labour 
regulations and policies, was established in 2007. Since the coverage of enterprise-based 
collective bargaining agreements was limited, the Ministry of Labour Invalids and Social 
Affairs (MOLISA) implemented a pilot project to train negotiating parties and generate 
collective agreements in the garment and textile industry with the support of USAID and 
the ILO. Workers and employer representatives of the sectors negotiated employment and 
employment security; working and rest hours; wages, bonus and wage allowance; labour 
norms; workplace safety and social insurance for workers. The pilot project noted some 
challenges such as representation issues, negotiation skills and a lack of understanding of 
applicable labour regulations (ILO, 2010). 
 
Today more collective bargaining agreements are reached with multiple employers in the 
same sector, but without sector-wide coverage. Under multi-employer Collective 
Bargaining Agreements (CBA), workers receive standardized benefits and wage packages. 
It is reported that this approach has seen a success in improving workplace 
communications between unions, workers, and employers and reducing strikes (USAID, 
web page). Multi-employer CBAs were reached in the garment, textile, leather, footwear 
and seafood sectors as of August 2011. The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
notes the importance of involving more enterprises under multi-employer CBAs (Hiep, 
2011). 
 
 
 
Social dialogue may directly foster bargained “protected mobility”. In Sweden, the law 
governing mass redundancies (Employment Protection Act, 1974) stipulates that in order 
to protect the workers with long tenure, the dismissing order is “LIFO” (last in, first out) 
but it also stipulates that if social partners bargain and agree on a different order (typically 
because the firm will demand to retain younger and more skilled workers, and offers 
compensating resources for the older workers to be dismissed through redundancy 
payments and intensive re-training and placement services), their decision will dominate 
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the law’s provision. This enables social partners to bargain and take their own 
responsibility9. A recent selection of in-depth case studies collected all around the world 
(from Australia to Egypt, Mexico and China) showed the crucial role played by social 
dialogue in the management of displaced workers (ILO 2013). 
 
• Examples of co-management of labour market institutions remain quite rare. One may 
cite the apprenticeship systems, co-managed by the social partners in Germany and 
Austria. Most often, social partners are involved in a tripartite management process 
with the State, this actor keeping the dominant role.  
It is of course difficult to directly assess the importance and consequences of constructive 
social dialogue as institutionalized practices in the labour market and employment 
relationships. A recent attempt has been made in the case of France (Cette and al. 2013). This 
study is based upon a survey of French manufacturing firms collected by the Banque de 
France over the period 1991 – 2008, including variables such as profitability and productivity, 
as well as variables depicting the quality of labour relations and the social climate. It 
considers the impact of “regulatory constraints” on the total factor productivity (TFP) in 
different social dialogue contexts. When social dialogue is weak and labour relations are 
characterized by “workforce or union opposition”, the influence of “regulatory constraints” is 
negative on the TFP. When firms are characterized by a good social climate and the presence 
of branch or firm agreements, these traits offset the negative impact of “regulatory 
constraints” on TFP, and the interaction of the variables “regulatory constraints” and “branch 
or firm agreement” yields a positive significant impact on TFP. 
 
3.2 Employment Protection Legislation 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is very often seen as a major culprit for “rigid” 
labour markets and is thus very often subject of reforms to allow more flexibility in labour 
market adjustment. It has three main components: first, the rules and constraints regarding the 
ability to hire and fire through open-ended work contracts; second the rules and constraints 
regarding short-term work contracts; and thirdt, the rules and constraints regarding mass 
dismissals (early notice, negotiated arrangements, severance pay…). However, even from a 
“pure market” point of view, EPL has strong justifications. When they dismiss workers, firms 
generate social costs such as income and consumption losses, unemployment, skills attrition, 
costs for labour market policies, etc. In this perspective, it is fair and efficient to ask firms to 
minimize such “negative externalities” by maintaining a fair degree of EPL. 
The key question becomes of course the “optimal” level of EPL. While excessive levels of 
EPL may deter employment creation, there is indeed a wide variety of EPL levels and 
modalities with many exceptions (e.g. for small firms) all around the world (for a careful 
balance, see Skedinger 2011). For example, firms only hiring their workforce on short-term 
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contracts will not be able to reap the gains from on-the-job training and from a continuous 
adaptation and progress. Firms facing relatively high levels of EPL may develop efficient 
tools for adapting their workforce internally and many studies show that there is a positive 
correlation between the level of EPL and (training) investments in the labour force.. However, 
in many developing countries, while formal levels of EPL seem sometimes excessive, 
enforcement is dramatically low and positive or negative effects of EPL can in fact not be 
analysed without (usually lacking) empirical evidence of enforcement. Thus, while many 
economists argue that EPL is a determining factor for widespread informality in the labour 
markets, this argument is usually assessed on legal rules only, but not on their enforcement.  
Employment Protection Legislation: the case of Indonesia 
 
Employment protection legislation is often seen as a cause of sluggish employment growth 
by observers since it increases the cost of hiring and firing workers. This view, however, is 
far too simplistic for understanding labour market dynamism, especially that of developing 
countries. Here we take the case of Indonesia to illustrate the point. 
The Manpower Law of 2003 stipulates hiring and firing practices, severance pay, and 
minimum wage setting, among other labour issues in Indonesia. The effect of the Law on 
employment has been a subject of debate. Some observers claim that rigid labour regulations 
have deterred job creation because tight employee protection and high severance pay 
discourage investment in Indonesia and hiring workers (World Bank 2010). Rapid increase in 
the minimum wages was blamed for stagnant growth in job opportunities in the formal 
economy (ibid.).  
Would reducing rigidity in employment protection legislation create more formal 
employment as predicted by proponents of flexible labour market? The answer for the case 
of Indonesia is largely no. If such a labour market reform had any effect on job creation, it 
would be most probably modest. This is because the causal relation between employment 
protection legislation and job growth is not as straightforward as is believed by observers in 
favour of more labour market flexibility. One must note that a variety of factors affects 
creation of productive employment: employment protection is merely one of such factors 
(ILO 2010); the weight of each factor differs depending on the country specific contexts.  
In the case of Indonesia, employee protection, though it is relatively tight in the region, has 
turned out not to be among the most influential factors affecting creation of productive 
employment. An investment climate survey by the University of Indonesia ranked labour 
regulation as the eleventh constraints, with macroeconomic instability, transport and 
corruption as the top three constraints. An executive opinion survey by the World Economic 
Forum echoed the finding and excluded labour market rigidity from the top five impediments 
to business operation in Indonesia. Therefore, it is unlikely for labour market reforms of 
weakening employment protection legislation to have substantial employment creation 
effect, if critical constraints to job growth are left intact. Further, a growth diagnostic report 
by the Asian Development Bank, the ILO and the Islamic Development Bank identified 
inadequate and poor quality of infrastructure, weaknesses in governance and institutions, and 
unequal access to and poor quality of education as critical constraints to inclusive and 
sustainable growth (ADB-ILO-IDB, 2010). Fine-tuning the suspension, when the engine is in 
defect, would not help the car run. 
 
3.3 Income Protection for the Unemployed  
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Social Security programs mainly replace lost income in specified situations such as illness, 
maternity, retirement and unemployment. Although it is essential in many countries to 
develop Social Security, especially “provident funds” enabling workers to accumulate 
pensions rights for their old age, we focus here on unemployment insurance (or 
unemployment benefits, hereunder UI). 
UI mitigates the adverse impact of job loss and enables the unemployed to seek for suitable 
jobs and/or receive training without incurring high financial and psychological costs 
associated with joblessness. It functions not only as an important safety net in the labour 
market, protecting transition capacities, but also as an automatic stabilizer of fluctuation in 
economic activities. Given these crucial roles played by UI, most developed countries have 
implemented mandatory and large UI10.  
Although the importance of UI is widely recognized, it is often considered as challenging to 
introduce it in developing countries since these countries hold a large share of workers in the 
informal economy and lack necessary administrative capacity. OECD-style UI is seen as 
unsuitable to developing countries and tailor-making UI to the country contexts is suggested 
(Vodopivec, 2009). Despite the challenges, many developing countries have implemented UI. 
Although a prevalence of informal employment does pose a significant challenge in 
expanding the coverage of UI, 7 to 13% of the unemployed in Argentina, Brazil, China, South 
Africa and Turkey were covered by UI in 2008 (ILO, 2010). 
 
Unemployment insurance: the case of Brazil 
 
Brazil’ Federal Constitution of 1988 has established social security in the country. Protection 
for unemployed workers fired without a justified reason and with at least 6 months of formal 
work prior to dismissal was introduced by Law no. 7998 on unemployment insurance in 
1990. Unemployment benefit (seguro-desemprego) replaces lost income, the amount of 
which is equivalent to the average monthly salary of the past three months prior to job loss 
but no less than the monthly minimum wage and no more than the predetermined upper 
ceiling. The duration of benefit is for three to five months, depending of the employment 
history over the past three years. Sales tax on firms funds UI in Brazil, while in most other 
countries contributions by workers and employers finance UI. UI supported income of 7.5 
million job seekers in 2010 and mitigated the impact of the global financial crisis.  
 Recent studies on Brazil’s UI have found positive labour market and welfare impact of the 
UI (Gerard and Gonzaga, 2011 and 2012). Although some observers argue that UI may 
discourage job losers from actively seeking jobs, little distortionary effect on the job-finding 
behaviour was observed in Brazil. In addition, welfare effect of extending UI programme is 
found to be positive and sizable. The case of Brazil indicates that a country with a large 
informal economy can still implement and administer UI successfully. 
 
3.4 Employment services  
                                                          
10
 Space precludes here a discussion on the correct design of an UI scheme, addressing the two classical stakes of 
“moral hazard” and “adverse selection”. For a recent and concise presentation, see Schmid 2013. 
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An important mechanism that corrects labour market failure is employment services. They 
comprise career guidance, job placement services and referral to training programmes.  
Without such services, matching the labour demand and supply may be suboptimal. For 
instance, jobseekers may spend more time to find suitable jobs or may take up less suitable 
jobs. Similarly, employers may not be able to recruit necessary workers with right skills and 
lose business opportunities.  
Considered in their interaction with UI, employment services may play an important role in 
enhancing transition capacities and ensuring a quick way back to work. It is often said that 
employment services are “active” while UI is “passive”. In developed countries this may lead 
to “activation” strategies, trying to limit UI and extend employment services. However, an 
efficient UI is a precondition for good matches in the labour market, and should be 
considered, combined with employment services, as an “active” investment in the workforce 
(Auer et al 2005). 
A central question regarding employment services is the role of public and private suppliers. 
Compared with most private recruitment agencies, public employment services support 
workers with relatively low skills and difficulties in placement. It is thus vital that public 
employment services help integrate low skilled workers in the labour market in order to 
enhance inclusiveness of growth. This could be done, either directly, or by developing 
partnerships with private organizations.  
 
 
Non-profit private employment services : the case of Cameroon 
 
Public employment services often face constraints including budget and service provision 
capacity. In this light, employment service in Cameroon is an interesting case. 
Youth Employment Service (YES) Cameroon was launched as a non-profit organization in 
2006 (YES Cameroon 2013). It operates in partnership with government ministries (Ministry 
of Youth Affairs, Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training and Ministry of External 
Relations), UN agencies, schools and training centres, employment services in other 
countries, foundations and NGOs. Activities of YES Cameroon include offering career 
counselling, training courses and small grant to start a business. The NPO does not provide 
referral services, yet its grass-root approach to support youth’s insertion in the labour market 
has been helpful. 
One of the challenges of providing employment services is outreach to jobseekers. Due to 
budget constraint, employment service centres are not ubiquitous in developing countries. In 
fact, jobseekers living in rural areas have limited physical access to employment service 
centres that are often located in large cities. Disseminating useful information in a cost-
effective manner to jobseekers remains as a challenge. An increasingly popular solution to 
this is the use of the Internet. Some employment services have developed online job database 
in which jobseekers search suitable jobs. YES Cameroon has been utilizing a popular social 
media to overcome this challenge. By utilizing an existing web platform, it saved the cost of 
developing and maintaining a website. Information on job fairs is widely disseminated 
thought the social media at no cost.  
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4. Protected mobility and the productive transformation of an economy 
 
In this last section we go back to a more global level and consider, from a dynamic point of 
view, the interaction of labour market institutions between themselves and with the overall 
economic and social productive transformation of a given country.  
It would be necessary here to explicitly introduce the variety of “employment regimes” and 
the macroeconomic context: the diversity of situations is  large all around the world. , as well 
as the dependency of labour markets on business cycle movements. To take but one example, 
the world crisis triggered in 2007 has had very different outcomes in the European Unions, 
some countries like Spain and Greece seeing a doubling or even a tripling of their 
unemployment rates, while others such as Germany or Austria, keeping the same (low) 
unemployment rate and benefitting, among other things, from the flexibility effects of short-
time working scheme, which are traditional labour market institutions used through all 
recessions (Schmid 2013). 
However, place constraints lead us to focus on the contribution of labour market institutions 
to the long-term growth process and to limit ourselves to some remarks. We shall evoke two 
general points and end up with an example of adaptable labour market institution.  
• First, the question of the “optimal” level of mobility, often left implicit, has been 
discussed by ILO researchers. Auer 2007a and b showed that available statistics 
setting a correlation between labour productivity and the length of tenure do not 
deliver a single message. A wide range of tenure lengths, between 5 to 13 years seems 
to be compatible with the same high level of productivity. In the case of Eastern and 
Central Europe countries, Cazes and Nesporova 2003 identify some evidence of 
excessive labour market mobility: they observe for these countries “a countercyclical 
movement of labour turnover and a pro-cyclical movement of job tenure, in direct 
contrast to developments in the (western) OECD countries” (p. 138), suggesting that 
even in economic booms workers prefer staying in their (stable) jobs, whereas the 
contrary is true in the West. There many workers look for new jobs in a positive 
growth context, but tend to stay on their jobs in recessions. These analyses have been 
recently confirmed from a more theoretical point of view by a working paper of the 
IMF (Blanchard et al 2013) showing the limits of external labour reallocation which 
may induce competencies losses and hinder on-the-job training. 
• A second line of remarks suggests that a homogeneous, adaptable and motivated 
workforce can be considered as a public good. Looking at the employment 
performance of countries all around the world, it has been observed that there is no 
systematic trade-off between quantity and quality of work (Erhel and Guergoat 2011). 
Competitive countries are characterized by a high quality workforce, benefitting from 
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high quality work and jobs, and by the same token they generate a larger quantity of 
jobs. An additional observation concerns gender considerations. The productive 
potential of women remains enormous and should be tapped more intensively, 
especially in developing countries. In the long run this can only be achieved though a 
better sharing of domestic and labour market work, i.e. through jobs allowing a better 
conciliation between both spheres and tending towards equality between women and 
men. 
 
• Third: in some countries, interesting steps have been made towards inclusive, 
legitimate, pro-active and “smart” labour market institutions. We present here an 
example from Austria, insisting on the pragmatic stance behind it. 
A case of institutional plasticity: The Work Foundations in Austria 
 
Dating back to 1987, the “Work Foundations” (WFs) are training, placement and re-
employment units used in cases of industrial restructuring and coping with mass dismissals. 
Their funding is original, because they were initially created by firms as foundations 
(independent bodies owning a stable capital given by a big firm engaged into restructuring) 
and benefit from three other resources: the full access to the Public Employment Services, a 
co-financing contribution coming from their “clients” (the dismissed workers) who give them 
50% of the interests paid on the sums yearly accumulated in their life-long severance pay 
account (a specific Austrian institution), and a contribution coming from the workers 
remaining employed in the dismissing firm and used for financing the retraining costs (in 
general, this contribution is around 0.5 % of the wage bill).  
WFs provide classical services such as competencies diagnosis, referral, (re)training and 
placement of the workers, with two original traits. First, they may propose quite long and 
even very long training programs, up to three years. Second, their “clients” are volunteers, 
easily recruited because workers feel confident and backed by their colleagues as well as by 
the whole community. These traits explain why they benefit from a good reputation, 
especially from potential employers.  
The first WF has been set up by a big metalworking firm, Voest-Alpine, and from the start 12 
firms were present. In 2011, 81 firms could benefit from this WF (Borghouts van de Pas 
2011). 
A first generation of enlarged versions emerged, adapted to different categories of workers 
and different situations: “insolvency WFs” (with a capital given by local communities), 
sectoral WFs and regional WFs, the last category being adapted for small and medium sized 
firms and for workers in short-term work contracts.  
Since 2000, a second generation of enlargement appeared, with the idea that WFs should also 
help  integrating unemployed workers by providing them the same services and guarantees. 
“In-placement” WFs have been created, offering intensive and long duration training 
sessions, especially to persons without apprenticeship records (In Austria apprenticeship is 
the main route from school to employment).  
In 2009, there were 141 WFs offering “out-placement” services and 175 WFs offering “in-
placement” services. The WFs have enrolled 10743 workers during this year, i.e. 5% of the 
Austrian unemployed. The medium length of their intervention is 300 days. 
An early systematic evaluation (Winter-Ebmer 2001) showed a positive outcome of such 
“Work Foundations”. More evaluation should be necessary in order to fully assess the costs 
and benefits of each type of WF.  
The case of the Austrian WFs shows how a legitimate and successful institution may be 
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extended, diffused in other contexts, and adapted to different challenges and beneficiaries. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This short survey has suggested some important channels through which labour markets 
institutions, albeit diverse, foster “protected mobility” and contribute to a productive and 
inclusive growth. Most of economic theories tend to envisage a “pure” market and consider 
any institutions and mechanisms that hamper the smooth function of the market as 
“disturbances” which are desired to be removed. We showed that, properly designed and 
managed, labour market institutions are collective assets, protecting and enhancing not only 
transitions capacity but also a necessary core stability in the labour market (e.g. good and 
stable long-term jobs). It is the capacity of LMIs to maintain productive jobs as well as acting 
as a security device during necessary labour market adjustment processes that will determine 
their effectiveness in regard to a more assertive demand side macroeconomic policy.   
In the future one may expect an even more ambitious role for these institutions, because the 
collective management of individual career discontinuities will call for new developments, 
involving more and more workers and promoting social inclusion as well as gender equality. 
For employment maintenance purposes new forms of internal adjustment have to be sought 
and for external adjustments one has to proceed from a narrow perception of unemployment 
insurance to a wider “employment insurance” (Schmid 2013). The task of these new or 
amended institutions should not only be to “make  workers   fit for the market”, but also to 
“make the market fit for workers”. 
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